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Abstract We analyse an overlapping generations economy with two sectors of production: a 
capital-intensive commodity sector and a labour-intensive services sector. First, we consider an 
economy with exogenous population and study the effects of a change in the individual preference 
for old-aged services that causes a reallocation of labour between sectors on per capita income. 
Then, we compare the results with the standard Diamond (1965) style one-sector economy. Second, 
we endogenise fertility founding that a reallocation of labour in favour of the services sector causes 
an additional beneficial effect on per capita income with respect to the model with exogenous 
population. Third, we further introduce endogenous lifetime through public health investments, 
showing that multiple regimes of development may exist. In this context, the a rise in the preference 
for old-aged services may help escaping from poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses two prominent problems on the political and economic debate of many 
countries: (i) population ageing, and (ii) the increasing demand for both health care provision and 
services for old age people. The productive structure of an economy can be broadly shared into two 
categories: capital-intensive commodities and labour-intensive services. A specific feature of the 
demand of the two categories is worth to be noted: the demand is different depending on the 
consumers’ age and, in particular, the demand for services is an increasing function of it. The need 
of older people to use more services that the younger emerges from both anecdotic and statistical 
sources: (i) for instance, The Economist argued that: “Older people are likely to spend more on 
medical care and domestic services, such as those of gardeners and cleaners. Younger people are 
likely to spend more on new products, such as mobile phones or computers (The price of age, The 
Economist, 21 December, 2000); (ii) budget surveys tend to reveal a larger service expenditure for 
the elderly. For instance, from the ONS Family Spending 2000–01 for the United Kingdom and 
from the CBS Budgetonderzoek for The Netherlands may be seen that the elderly spend 1.5 times 
of their total expenditures on services more than younger people.1 Therefore, to capture this feature 
of consumptions in this model we assume, for simplicity, that only the old-aged spend on services.2 
    In this paper the number of children is endogenously chosen by individuals, while the rate of 
longevity depends on the public health expenditure. 
                                               
1
 Both instances are drawn by van Groezen et al. (2005, p. 648; 2007a, p. 736). 
2
 This assumption captures the feature of the need of higher demand for services by the older people, standing in the 
middle between the assumption made by van Groezen et al. (2007b), where young- and old-aged consume both goods 
and services, and the assumption made by van Groezen et al. (2005, 2007a), where young people only consumes goods 
and old people only consume services. It must be noted, however, that while a similarity as regards the assumption of a 
two-sector economy exists between the present model and theirs, van Groezen et al. (2007a; 2007b) focused on pension 
problems, while van Groezen et al (2005) built on a model with exogenous demographic variables and analysed the 
effect of a rise in the rate of longevity on both the production structure of the economy and economic growth. 
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    Most articles that investigated the mutual relationship between economic and demographic 
outcomes only considered either a static partial equilibrium context (e.g., Apps and Rees, 2004) or, 
in a general equilibrium context accounted for neither the existence of aggregate consumption of 
goods and services, nor the consequences that a two-sector economy may have on economic and 
demographic performances (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004). In addition to the above mentioned 
assumption of a two-sector economy, and different from most papers that neglect either endogenous 
fertility (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004) or the production side of the economy (e.g. Blackburn and 
Cipriani, 2002), another distinguishing feature of the present paper is that the components of 
demographic behaviour (i.e. fertility and longevity) are endogenously determined in a dynamic 
general equilibrium context. 
    A crucial key ingredient for a change in the sector composition is represented by the change in 
individual savings. In fact, the saving rate directly affects the demand for services by augmenting 
the income of the elderly, and by determining capital and wages it affects the capital intensity in the 
commodity sector, the return on savings – and thus both the income of the elderly and demand for 
services – and the price of the service. Therefore, to the extent that changes in fertility and longevity 
affect individual savings, the sector composition changes as well. But the effect of the demographic 
variable through savings is only a part of the story: indeed the dependency ratio also causes a direct 
effect on the demand for old-aged services, and thus population ageing in itself shifts the sector 
composition towards a larger share for the production of services. 
    The focus of the paper grounds on studying the effect of the demand for old-aged services within 
a neoclassical overlapping generations (OLG) growth model (Diamond, 1965) modified to account 
for two production sectors (i.e. the commodity and the service sectors), where an endogenous 
relationship between fertility, life expectancy, health care provision and output emerges. The 
importance of an endogenous relationship between economic and demographic variables stands in 
the fact that a higher level of per worker GDP induced by a certain change in economic or policy 
parameters, does not necessarily imply a higher level of per capita GDP when both fertility and 
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longevity are endogenous. For example, a rise in the per worker stock of capital (and thus in the per 
worker GDP) may be associated with a higher longevity, but the final effect on the level of per 
capita GDP is a priori uncertain. This argument holds even in a one-sector economy, but it is even 
more relevant in a two-sector context because, for instance, a rise in life expectancy may be 
associated with a change in the sector composition so that san increasing longevity has an even 
more uncertain effect on the neoclassical economic growth. 
    The structure of the paper may be divided into three parts. The first part consider the effect on 
economic growth occurring when the basic Diamond’s (one-sector) model is extended with two 
productive sectors and shows that per worker GDP (which is the same of per capita GDP in such a 
context because both fertility and longevity are exogenously given) increases monotonically with 
the preference for the demand of old-aged services. 
    The second part extends the two sector model by considering fertility as a choice variable 
determined by individuals, in line with the approach of the home economics (Becker, 1960; 
Eckstein and Wolpin; 1985; Galor and Weil, 1996). We found that the positive effect of the 
preference for old-aged services on economic growth – as shown in the first part – is reinforced 
when fertility is endogenous. This because a rise in the preference for the demand for services 
increases the wage rate and this in turn raises the individual demand for children. As a consequence, 
the dependency ratio is reduced and thus the per capita GDP is increased. 
    The third part of the paper also accounts for the endogenisation of mortality rates assuming that 
the probability of surviving from the first period of life to the next depends upon health capital that 
is augmented through public investment financed by a wage tax.3 While the provision of health care 
services on the one side competes resources away (through the taxation) from consumption, savings 
and children, on the other side it prolongs life expectancy that leads in turn to higher capital 
accumulation, higher demand of services and a larger number of heads, so that the effect of health 
                                               
3
 The assumption that the probability of surviving depends on a certain measure of public health care services follows 
Chakraborty (2004). 
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policies on economic growth may appear, a priori, uncertain. We show – with respect to the 
previous models with exogenous longevity – that the role played by the preference for old-aged 
services on economic growth is enriched by two new effects: since a rise in the preference for 
services tends increase life expectancy (through the rise in wages and thus in the provision of public 
health care services), then (i) the per worker GDP increases because of the positive effect of 
longevity on capital accumulation, but (ii) the per capita GDP shrinks owing to the increased 
number of living old age people in the economy. The overall effect, however, is positive and thus 
per capita GDP increases. 
    Moreover, when lifetime is endogenous, multiple steady states may exist, generating the so-
called poverty trap: unless a high-mortality society starts out with a high enough capital stock 
(above a certain threshold level), it is unable to escape the vicious cycle of poverty and ill-health.4 
We show that the higher the preference for old age services, the more likely high-mortality societies 
will escape from poverty. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model with 
exogenous fertility and exogenous longevity. In Section 3 takes into endogenous fertility decision of 
individuals. Section 4 considers an economy where both fertility and longevity are endogenous. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model with exogenous population 
 
Consider a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) closed economy populated by 
identical individuals and identical firms. Young population evolves according to tt NnN =+1 , where 
                                               
4
 The multiple steady state scenario exists, however, even in the one-sector model when the output elasticity of capital is 
relatively high and threshold effects exists in the distribution of public health investments across population (see Fanti 
and Gori, 2009). 
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n  is the exogenous number of children of individuals, and two sectors of production exist: the 
commodity sector and the services sector (see van Groezen et al., 2007b). 
 
2.1. Firms 
 
The commodity sector. At time t  firms produce a homogeneous good ( tY ) combining capital ( tK ) 
and the number of young people employed in the commodity sector ( tYL , ) through the constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology αα −= 1
,tYtt LAKY , where 0>A  is a scale parameter and 
10 << α  the output elasticity of capital. Firms maximise profits and perfect competition guarantees 
that factor inputs are paid their marginal products, that is 
 1
1
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where ttt NKk /:=  is the per worker stock of capital and ttYtY NLl /: ,, =  is the fraction of young 
people in the economically active population employed in the commodity sector.5 
 
The services sector. Production takes place only with labour. The technology is linear and given by 
tDLD ,=  where tDL ,  is the number of people employed in that sector. Since labour is homogenous 
and perfectly mobile, the price of services in terms of commodities ( tp ) equals the wage in the 
commodity sector, that is tt wp = . 
 
2.2. Individuals 
                                               
5
 The price of final output is normalised to unity and capital totally depreciates at the end of each period. 
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Agents of each generation live for two periods: youth (working period) and old age (retirement 
period). Each young supplies inelastically his endowment of one unit of time in each period and 
receives a unitary wage income at the competitive rate w . Therefore, the budget constraint of an 
individual born at t  reads as: 
 ttt wsc =+,1 , (3) 
i.e. wage income is divided into young-aged consumption for commodities, tc ,1 , and savings, ts .  
    Moreover, we assume that at the end of youth survival is uncertain and the probability of 
surviving from work time to retirement time is 10 << pi . 
    Old individuals are retired and live uniquely with the amount of resources saved when young 
plus the interest accrued from time t  to time 1+t  at the rate 1+tr . The existence of a perfect annuity 
market (where savings are intermediated through mutual funds) implies that old survivors will 
benefit not only from their own past saving plus interest, but also from the saving plus interest of 
those who have deceased. Hence, the budget constraint of an old retired agent started working at t  
can be expressed as 
 t
t
ttt s
rdpc
pi
1
1,211,2
1 +
+++
+
=+ , (4) 
where 1,2 +tc  is old-aged consumption for commodities and 1,2 +td  is the number of services used 
when old. 
    The representative individual entering the working period at t  must choose consumption for 
commodities when young and old and the number of both commodities and services when old in 
order to maximise the following logarithmic utility function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1,21,2,1 lnln1ln ++ +−+= tttt dccU λλβpi , (5) 
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subject to Eqs. (3) and (4), where β  is the subjective discount factor and λ  captures the relative 
importance of consuming services when old. The constrained maximisation of Eq. (5) gives the 
following demand functions: 
 βpi+= 1,1
t
t
w
c , (6) 
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+−
=
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+ 1
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rd , (8) 
while the saving rate is 
 βpi
βpi
+
=
1
t
t
w
s , (9) 
 
2.3. Equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium in the services market is given by tttD dNL ,21, −= pi , or 
 
n
d
l ttD
,2
,
pi
= , (10) 
    The equilibrium in the labour market is given by tDtYt LLN ,, += , or 
 tDtY ll ,,1 += , (11) 
where ttDtD NLl /,, =  is the fraction of young people in the economically active population 
employed in the services sector. 
    The equilibrium in the commodity sector is ( ) ttttttYt cNscNLAK ,21,1, −−1 ++= piαα , or 
tttttYt cNwNLAK ,21, −
−1 += piαα , that is 
 
n
c
wlAk tttYt
,21
,
piαα +=− , (12) 
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    Market-clearing in goods and capital market leads to the usual equilibrium condition 
tttt NskN =++ 11 , or 
 tt skn =+1 . (13) 
Exploiting Eqs. (13) and (9) we get: 
 ( )n
wk tt βpi
βpi
+
=+ 11
. (14) 
    Substituting out for tw  from Eq. (2), the dynamic path of capital accumulation is: 
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Y
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n
Ak
1
1
1 . (15) 
    Now, using Eqs. (1), (2) and (11) together with the one period backward Eqs. (8) and (14) we 
find that 
 ( )λα
λα
−−
=
11D
l , (16) 
so that 
 ( )λα
α
−−
−
=
11
1
Yl . (17) 
The reallocation of labour between sectors depends on both the preference for old-aged services and 
the output elasticity of capital in the commodity sector. In particular, a rise in either λ  or α  
reduces (increases) the fraction of young population employed in the commodity (services) sector, 
that is ( )( )[ ] 011
1
2 <
−−
−−
=
∂
∂
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λ
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 and ( )[ ] 011 2 <−−
−
=
∂
∂
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1
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−
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λ
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 and 
( )[ ] 011 2 >−−=∂
∂
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λ
α
Dl ). Moreover, the higher the preference for old-aged services, the lower the 
intensity of labour reallocation in favour of the services sector, that is ( )( )[ ] 011
12
3
2
2
2
<
−−
−−
=∂
∂
λα
αα
λ
Dl
. 
    Steady state implies kkk tt ==+1 . Therefore, combining Eqs. (15) and (17) the steady state stock 
of capital is 
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    From Eq. (18) it can easily be seen that a rise in λ  increases the steady state stock of capital, that 
is 0>
∂
∂
λ
k
, since 0<
∂
∂
Yl
k
 and 0<
∂
∂
λ
Yl
. A rise in λ  reduces the fraction of young people employed 
in the commodity sector and this increases the wage rate. A rise in the wage rate increase savings 
and this in turn increases the stock of capital in per worker terms. 
    In this two-sector economy the per capita income at time t  is obtained as 
1−+
+
tt
ttt
NN
DwY
pi
, or 
( )
1−+
+
tt
tttt
NN
dwyN
pi
 where ty  and td  represent the per worker production in the commodity and services 
sectors, respectively. The latter equation can be rearranged to obtain: 
 ( ) Fdwyq tttt ⋅+=: , (19) 
where 
n
n
nF
pipi +
=
+
=
1
1
:  with 
n
pi
 being the dependency ratio. 
    At the steady state αα −= 1YlAky and Yld −= 1 . Therefore, the effects of a rise in λ  on per capita 
income are the following: 
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, (20) 
From Eq. (20) we see that a rise in λ  has a threefold effect on per capita income. First, it reduces is 
the fraction of young people in the economically active population employed in the commodity 
sector. Moreover, a reduction in Yl  increases the per worker stock of capital. Then both forces act 
positively on wages and then on per capita income. Second, it increases the fraction of young 
people in the economically active population employed in the services sector, and this increases per 
worker production in that sector, and through this channel per capita income. Third, an ambiguous 
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effect exist on per worker production in the commodity sector. In fact, a rise λ  reduces Yl , and this 
tends to lower y . However, the reduction in Yl  also increases k , and this in turn produces a 
positive effect on y . As can easily be shown when the output elasticity of capital is 2/1<α  
( 2/1>α ), the negative (positive) effect dominates causing a reduction (increase) in the production 
of commodities. Therefore, if 2/1<α  ( 2/1>α ) a rise λ  causes a counterbalancing negative force 
due to lower production in the commodity sector (a strengthening positive force due to higher 
production in the commodity sector) on per capita income. 
    Therefore, the following remarks holds: 
 
Remark 1. The wage rate increases with λ  because the labour input in the commodity sectors is 
reduced. 
 
Remark 2. A rise in λ  reduces (increases) output per worker in the commodity sector y  if 
2/1<α  ( 2/1>α ). 
 
Remark 3. A rise in λ  increases monotonically output per worker in the services sector d . 
 
    In the following proposition, however, we show the overall effect of a rise in λ  on per capita 
income is always positive, that is irrespective of whether the output elasticity of capital is relatively 
high or low a reallocation of labour in favour of the services sector is income improving, and this in 
turn implies that the per capita income in a two-sector economy is always higher than that would be 
obtained in the standard Diamond’s (1965) one-sector economy. 
 
Proposition 1. The per capita income a two-sector economy is always higher than that in a one-
sector economy. 
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Proof. The steady-state per capita income in this two-sector economy may be expressed as 
 ( )[ ] ( )λλ α GkAFq ⋅⋅⋅= , (21) 
where ( ) ( )( )[ ]αλ
λααλ
Y
Y
l
lG +−= 1: . 
    Since 
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Y
l
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then Proposition 1 follows. Q.E.D. 
 
3. Endogenous fertility 
 
In this section we consider fertility to be endogenously determined by individuals as a rational 
comparison between benefits and costs of children. Agents of each generation are identical and live 
for three periods: childhood (during which individuals do not make economic decisions), youth 
(working and child bearing time) and old age (retirement time). The representative individual, 
therefore, that seeks to maximise the lifetime utility function with respect to consumption for 
commodities and fertility when young and consumption for commodities and services when old: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1,21,2,1 lnln1lnln ++ +−++= ttttt dcncU λλβpiφ , (23) 
subject to 
 tttt wensc =++,1 , (24) 
and Eq. (4), where φ  is the relative taste for children, e  is the fixed cost of raising a child and tn  is 
the number of children at time t . The demand functions, therefore, are the following: 
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while the saving rate is 
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s . (29) 
    The equilibrium in the services market is given by 
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, (30) 
    The equilibrium in the labour market is determined by Eq. (11), while the equilibrium in the 
commodity sector is 
 
1
,21
,
−
− +−=
t
t
tttYt
n
c
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, (31) 
    Market-clearing in goods and capital market implies 
 ttt skn =+1 . (32) 
Exploiting Eq. (32) together with Eqs. (28) and (29) we get: 
 φ
βpi ekkt ==+1 . (33) 
    Therefore, 
 
Remark 4. When fertility is endogenously determined by individuals and the cost of children is 
fixed, the per worker equilibrium stock of capital is constant and independent of Yl . 
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    Now, using Eqs. (1), (2) and (11) together with the one period backward Eqs. (33), (28) and (27) 
we find that Dl  and Yl  are constant and determined by Eqs. (16) and (17), respectively. Therefore, 
Remark 1 and 3 hold, while 
 
Remark 5. A rise in λ  reduces monotonically the output per worker in the commodity sector y . 
 
Since αα −= 1YlAky  and k  is independent of λ , a rise in the preference for old-aged services, 
increases labour in that sector while reducing labour in the commodity sector. Hence, output per 
worker in the commodity sector shrinks. Moreover, 
 
Remark 6. A rise in λ  reduces Yl  and in turn increases the wage rate. Since n  is a monotonic 
increasing function of the wage, a reallocation of the labour input in favour of the services sector 
increases the steady-state fertility rate. 
 
    Different from the world with exogenous population, in an endogenous fertility setting the effects 
of λ  on per capita income are different. From Remark 6, the preference for old-aged services 
affects fertility and, through this channel, the per capita income. 
    The steady-state per capita income expressed in terms of commodities is given by 
 ( ) ( )λλα GFkAq ⋅⋅⋅= , (34) 
where ( ) ( )( ) piλ
λλ
+
=
n
nF : . Therefore, 
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. The effect of ( )λG  on per capita 
income is the same as in the model with exogenous fertility. However, an additional effect exists 
that passes through the function ( )λF : a rise in the preference for old-aged services reduces the 
labour input in the commodity sector and this in turn increases the wage rate. Higher wages mean 
higher fertility. A higher fertility rate gives rise to a positive additional effect of λ  on per capita 
income. Therefore, the following propositions hold: 
 
Proposition 2. The per worker income dwy +  in a two-sector endogenous fertility economy 
increases monotonically with λ . 
 
Proof. Since k  is constant and independent of λ , the proof is obvious from the sign of the second 
addendum in square brackets in (35). Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3. When fertility is endogenous, a rise in λ  causes a positive fertility effect on per 
capita income in addition to the positive monotonic effect on per worker income. 
 
Proof. The proof is given by the sign Eq. (35). 
 
4. Endogenous fertility and endogenous longevity 
 
The government now invests in public health (e.g. hospitals, vaccination programmes, scientific 
research and so on) and finances health capital through a constant wage income tax 10 << τ  (see 
Chakraborty, 2004). Therefore, at time t  the public health budget (in per worker terms) reads as 
 tt wh τ= , (36) 
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where the left-hand side is the health expenditure and the right-hand side the tax receipt. 
    The budget constraint of an individual born at t  becomes: 
 ( )τ−=++ 1
,1 tttt wensc , (37) 
i.e. wage income – net of contributions paid to finance health expenditure – is divided into 
consumption for commodities when young, tc ,1 , savings, ts  and the fixed cost e  of raising tn  
children. 
    Following Chakraborty (2004), we assume that at the end of youth survival is uncertain and the 
probability of surviving from work time to retirement time, tpi , is an increasing – though bounded – 
function of the public health measure th . Different from Chakraborty (2004), however, we follow 
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Blackburn and Issa (2002) and specialise the relationship 
between public health investments and life expectancy with the following logistic-typed function 
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t
t
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    Eq. (5) allows us to capture various aspects of the evolution of the length of life of the typical 
agent through the retirement age. First, we define 0pi  as being the exogenous “natural” rate of 
longevity of people in a country: it represents the fraction of time lived by individuals at the end of 
youth irrespective of whether the government invests in public health or not, and may affected by 
both economic and non-economic factors, e.g. the lifestyle of people, education, economic growth 
and the standards of living, the degree of culture and civilisation, weather and climate changes, 
ethnical and civil wars, endemic diseases and so on. Thus, we may expect 0pi  to be higher in 
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developed rather than developing or under-developed nations, and the more individuals naturally 
live longer, the smaller the reduction in adult mortality due to a rise in public health expenditure. 
Second, the parameter 1pi  captures the intensity of the efficiency of public health investments on the 
rate of longevity. A rise in 1pi  may be interpreted as exogenous medical advances due, for instance, 
to scientific research, vaccination programmes and so on. Third, we may think, realistically, that 
health investments have a more intense effect in reducing adult mortality often when a certain 
threshold level of public health expenditure has been reached, while becoming scarcely effective 
when longevity is close to its saturating value (e.g., the functional relationship between health 
investment and longevity may be S-shaped). The parameters δ  and ∆  both allow to capture such 
an idea and determine both the turning point of ( )hhpi ′  and speed of convergence from the natural 
length of life 0pi  to the saturating value 1pi . In particular, given the value of ∆ , the parameter δ  
represents the degree of proportionality in the distribution of public health investments across 
population as an inducement to higher life expectancy, other things being unchanged. In other 
words, it measures how an additional unit of public health capital is transformed into higher 
longevity through the public health technology. If 1≤δ , ( )hpi  is concave for any h  and, hence, no 
threshold effects of public health investments on longevity exist, i.e. the distribution of an 
additional unit of health capital is relatively widespread and smooth across population, so that 
longevity increases monotonically with decreasing returns from the starting point 0pi  to the 
saturating value 1pi  as h  rises, and the more δ  is close to zero the more efficiently and rapidly an 
additional unit of health capital is transformed into higher longevity when h  is relatively low, while 
reaching the saturating value 1pi  more slowly as h  becomes larger. Figure 1 illustrates in a stylised 
way the evolution of the rate of longevity as a function of public health capital when 1≤δ : the 
solid (dashed) [dotted] line refers to the case 1=δ  ( 1<δ ) [ 0→δ ]. As can readily be seen the 
lower (higher) is δ  the more (less) efficient is an additional unit of public health capital 
expenditure as an inducement to higher life expectancy until (once) a certain level of h  is reached. 
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Figure 1. Longevity and public health capital when 1≤δ . 
 
In contrast, when 1>δ  the longevity function is S-shaped and, hence, threshold effects exist in the 
way in which public health investments are distributed across population and then transformed into 
higher longevity. In particular, longevity increases more (less) than proportionally when Thh <  
( Thh > ), i.e. it grows with increasing (decreasing) returns until (once) the turning point Th  is 
reached. However, a rise in δ  shifts the longevity function to the right while also increasing the 
speed of convergence from 0pi  to 1pi , as clearly shown in Figure 2 below, where the solid (dashed) 
[dotted] line refers to lowδ  ( highδ ) [ +∞→δ ]. The distribution of an additional unit of health capital 
is not smooth across population in that case and, in particular, an increasing amount of public health 
expenditure is required to trigger beneficial effects on longevity, and the higher δ  is the more 
slowly an additional unit of health investments is transformed into higher life expectancy when h  is 
relatively low, while reaching the saturating value 1pi  more efficiently and rapidly as h  becomes 
larger. 
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Figure 2. Longevity and public health capital when 1>δ . 
 
This means that increasing public health expenditure is not effective as an inducement to higher 
longevity until a threshold value of health capital is accumulated (and this value is larger the larger 
is δ ), because, for instance, a certain degree of knowledge to enable health investments to be 
distributed and transformed efficiently into a higher longevity has not yet been reached. Beyond 
that threshold, however, a “sudden” effect exists that efficiently allows such a transformation. As an 
example, we may think about the existence of threshold effects in the accumulation of knowledge 
required for new medical advances and discoveries in the treatment of diseases (e.g. vaccines) to be 
effective and efficient: the public health expenditure to finance new research projects may be high 
and apparently useless up to a certain degree of knowledge is achieved. Once that threshold is 
reached, however, there exists a sudden effect that allows to trigger and bring to light the beneficial 
effects of the new discoveries, to make them efficient, usable and operative across population and 
eventually transformed into a higher life expectancy. 
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    The representative individual entering the working period at t  must choose consumption for 
commodities when young and old, the number of services when old and the number of children in 
order to maximise  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1,21,2,1 lnln1lnln ++ +−++= tttttt dcncU λλβpiφ , (39) 
Eq. (4) and (37). The demand functions therefore are the following: 
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while the saving rate is 
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with tpi  being determined by Eq. (38) upon substitution of th  from Eq. (36). 
    The equilibrium in the services market is given by ttttD dNL ,211, −−= pi , or 
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    The equilibrium in the labour market is given by tDtYt LLN ,, += , or 
 tDtY ll ,,1 += . (46) 
    The equilibrium in the commodity sector is ( ) tttttttYt cNeNwNLAK ,2111, 1 −−+−1 +−−= piταα , that is 
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    Market-clearing in goods and capital market leads to 
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 ttt skn =+1 . (48) 
Therefore, upon substitution for tn  and ts  from (43) and (44) into (48) we get 
 
( )
φ
βpi elkk Yttt ,1 =+ . (49) 
    Since Dl  and Yl  are determined by (16) and (17), respectively, using (49), (38), (36) and (2) the 
dynamic path of capital accumulation is: 
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where ( )[ ]δατ AB −∆= 1:  and ( ) ( )
αδ
α
λαλ 
	



−
−−
=
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11
:M  are two positive constant used to simplify 
notation. 
    Different from the model of the previous sections, when longevity is endogenous and determined 
by public health investments the dynamic path of capital accumulation Eq. (50) may give rise to 
multiple development regimes, and changes in the allocation of labour between sectors through a 
change in the preference for old-aged services affects both the transitional dynamics and steady 
states of the economy. In the next section, therefore, we study how the steady state outcomes (i.e. 
macroeconomic and demographic variables) in both low and high income countries are affected by 
a rise in λ . 
 
4.1. Dynamics 
 
Analysis of Eq. (50) gives the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. Let either (i) 1≤δ  or (ii) 1>δ  and δα
10 <<  hold. Then the dynamic system 
described by Eq. (50) possesses only one positive asymptotically stable steady state { }k . Let 1>δ  
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and 11 << αδ  hold. Then the dynamic system described by Eq. (50) admits either one positive 
asymptotically stable steady state { }k  or three positive steady states { }321 ,, kkk , with 123 kkk >>  
(only the first and the third being asymptotically stable). 
 
Proof. Let first the following lemma be established. 
 
Lemma 1. Define the right-hand side of (50) as ( )kJ . Then, we have: (1.i) ( ) φ
piβ 00 eJ = , (1.ii) 
( ) 0>′ kJk  for any 0>k , (1.iii) ( ) 0lim =′+∞→ kJkk , (1.iv) if 1≤δ , then ( ) 0<′′ kJkk  for any 0>k , 
(1.v) if 1>δ  and δα
10 << , then ( ) 0<′′ kJkk  for any 0>k , (1.vi) if 1>δ  and 11 << αδ , then 
( ) 0
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αδ
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kk f . 
 
From Eq. (50), property (1.i) is straightforward. Differentiating the right-hand side of (50) with 
respect to k  gives 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01 201 >+
−
=′
λφ
λpipiαδβ
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αδ
MBkk
MkeBkJk , (51) 
which proves (1.ii). Moreover, 
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which proves (1.iii). 
    Now, differentiating (51) with respect to k  gives 
 22 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]( )[ ]3201 1
11
λφ
αδλαδpipiλαδβ
αδ
αδαδ
MBkk
kBMkeBMkJkk
+
+−−−
=′′ . (52) 
From (52), it is straightforward to see that if 1≤δ , then ( ) 0<′′ kJkk  for any 0>k . This proves 
(1.iv). If 1>δ  and δα
10 << , then ( ) 0<′′ kJkk  for any 0>k . This proves (1.v). If 1>δ  and 
11 << αδ , then ( ) 0<
>
′′ kJkk  if and only if ( )( )
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αδλ
αδ
1
1
1
: 

	




+
−
=
>
<
BM
kk f . This proves (1.vi). 
 
Proposition 4 therefore follows. In fact, by property (1.i), zero can never be an equilibrium of Eq. 
(50) and the phase map ( )kJ  starts on the vertical axis at the point ( ) φ
piβ 00 eJ =
 . Moreover, by 
(1.ii) and (1.iii), ( )kJ  is a monotonic increasing function of k  and eventually falls below the 45° 
line, so that at least one positive stable steady state exists for any 0>k . 
    If 1≤δ , then (1.iv) holds and ( )kJ  is a concave function for any 0>k . Hence, one and only one 
positive asymptotically stable steady state exists in that case. 
    If 1>δ  and δα
10 << , then (1.v) holds and ( )kJ  is a concave function for any 0>k . Hence, 
one and only one positive asymptotically stable steady state exists in that case. 
    If 1>δ  and 11 << αδ , then (1.vi) holds and a unique positive inflection point fk  exists for any 
0>k , so that ( )kJ  is a convex (concave) function for any fkk <<0  ( fkk > ). Since at least one 
positive stable steady state exists, then for any 0>k  the phase map ( )kJ  may intersect the 45° line 
from below at most once before falling below it. Therefore, either one positive asymptotically stable 
steady exists or at most one positive steady state separates the lowest asymptotically stable steady 
state from the highest asymptotically stable one, and, thus, the number of equilibria is three. Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 4 shows that when both threshold effects in the distribution of health investments across 
population exist and the output elasticity of capital is high enough two development regimes are 
possible in this stylised two-sector economy. The high regime is characterised low mortality and 
high capital accumulation, per capita income, wages and fertility. The low regime, instead, is 
characterised by high mortality and low capital accumulation, per capita income, wages and 
fertility. 
 
4.2. Discussions 
 
A change in the preference for the number of old-aged service changes the allocation of the fraction 
of workers employed in both the commodity and services sector. In particular, as noted in the 
previous sections a rise in λ  increases in the fraction of workers employed in the services sector 
while reducing those employed in the commodity sector, i.e. Dl  increases and Yl  shrinks. A 
reduction in Yl  causes in turn a rise in wages that directly promotes savings and capital 
accumulation. Higher wages, however, means both higher fertility and longevity. In particular, the 
increased life expectancy of people causes an impetus to increase further the saving rate and this 
produces a positive indirect effect on capital accumulation. Definitively, the shape of the function 
( )kJ  raises as a consequence of a redistribution of labour in favour of the services sector, i.e. 
capital accumulation in both regimes of development increases. In particular, the following result 
holds: 
 
Result 1. A rise in the preference for old-aged services increases both the lowest and highest stable 
steady states, reduces the intermediate unstable steady state, while shrinking the size of the basin of 
attraction towards the poverty trap. Moreover, a large enough increase in λ  may cause the loss of 
the lowest stable steady state, thus allowing poorer economies to escape permanently from poverty 
and, hence, converge towards the high regime of development.. 
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    Figure 3 below illustrates in a stylised way Result 1, showing the beneficial effect of λ  on 
capital accumulation. 
 
 
Figure 3. Multiple steady states in a two-sector economy. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, when λ  is high enough the low equilibrium vanishes and all 
economies converge towards the high regime of development (see the dotted line in Figure 3). 
 
4.3. Steady-state: macroeconomic and demographic outcomes 
 
Tables 1 and 2 below show the behaviour of macroeconomic and demographic variables when λ  
varies for two different values of the output elasticity of capital in the commodity sector, i.e., 
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33.0=α  (Table 1) and 37.0=α  (Table 2).6 We take the following parameter set (chosen only for 
illustrative purposes): 13=A , 60.0=β , 30.0=φ , 10.00 =pi , 85.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 10.0=τ  
and 2=e . 
 
Table 1. Long-run outcomes of the economy when 33.0=α  and λ  varies. 
 
Low regime 
λ  0 0.10 
1k  0.455 0.472 
( )1kw  6.71 6.91 
( )1kpi  0.113 0.118 
( )1kn  0.662 0.680 
( )1kq  (per capita income) 8.556 8.652 
Dl  0 0.046 
Yl  1 0.953 
 
High regime 
λ  0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.99 
3k  3.152 3.194 3.25 3.29 3.31 3.33 3.34 
( )3kw  12.72 12.98 13.45 13.87 14.26 14.62 14.78 
( )3kpi  0.788 0.798 0.813 0.822 0.829 0.833 0.835 
                                               
6
 We used values of the output elasticity of capital around 1/3 as it is usually assumed in literature (for estimates of α  
in different countries see, e.g., Jones, 2003). 
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( )3kn  0.968 0.985 1.01 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.10 
( )3kq  (per capita 
income) 
10.47 10.53 10.67 10.82 10.98 11.14 11.22 
Dl  0 0.046 0.128 0.197 0.256 0.307 0.327 
Yl  1 0.953 0.871 0.802 0.743 0.692 0.672 
 
Table 2. Long-run outcomes of the economy when 37.0=α  and λ  varies. 
 
Low regime 
λ  0 0.10 0.30 0.50 
1k  0.415 0.42 0.433 0.457 
( )1kw  5.91 6.069 6.381 6.744 
( )1kpi  0.103 0.105 0.108 0.114 
( )1kn  0.586 0.601 0.631 0.665 
( )1kq  (per capita 
income) 
7.98 8.03 8.16 8.36 
Dl  0 0.055 0.149 0.226 
Yl  1 0.944 0.85 0.773 
 
High regime 
λ  0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.99 
3k  3.096 3.168 3.253 3.30 3.329 3.348 3.354 
( )3kw  12.44 12.81 13.45 14.01 14.51 14.98 15.18 
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( )3kpi  0.774 0.792 0.813 0.825 0.832 0.837 0.838 
( )3kn  0.951 0.974 1.015 1.053 1.089 1.122 1.136 
( )3kq  (per capita 
income) 
10.89 10.99 11.20 11.42 11.65 11.88 11.98 
Dl  0 0.055 0.149 0.226 0.291 0.345 0.367 
Yl  1 0.944 0.85 0.773 0.708 0.654 0.632 
 
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, a rise in λ  causes a rise in capital accumulation, wages, life 
expectancy, fertility and per capita income in both regimes. Moreover, when 33.0=α  values of λ  
beyond 0.10 are able to allow low-income economies to escape permanently from poverty and 
converge towards the high regime where per capita income, fertility and longevity are higher. The 
beneficial effect of λ  on capital accumulation, however, are slightly reduced when the output 
elasticity of capital increases (see the case 37.0=α  in Table 2), other things being unchanged. In 
fact, in that case the threshold value of λ  beyond which the poverty trap is lost is 0.50. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We analysed an overlapping generations economy with two sectors of production: the commodity 
sector and the services sector. We assumed that these services are consumed only by the old age 
people. We studied how a reallocation of labour in favour of the labour-intensive services sector 
affects both macroeconomic and demographic variables. A crucial key ingredient for a change in 
the sector composition is represented by the change in individual savings. 
    The paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the effect of a reallocation of labour 
in favour in the services sector on economic growth and compares the results with that obtained in 
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the basic Diamond’s (one-sector) model. We found that the per capita GDP increases monotonically 
with the individual preference for old-aged services. 
    The second part extends the two sector model by considering endogenous fertility. In that case, 
the positive effect of the preference for old-aged services on the (neoclassical) economic growth is 
reinforced due to the increased fertility rate. 
    The third part of the paper also takes into account endogenous longevity through public 
investments. With respect to the previous models with exogenous longevity multiple regimes of 
development may exist. In this context, a rise in the preference for old age services may help 
escaping from poverty. 
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